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INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary situation in the comparative study of religious 
phenomena by social scientists seems to be in a state of considerable 
disarray, if not confusion; such is the impression from a perusal of the 
pertinent literature on methodological and theoretical issues in the field.l 
Facile explanations and categorizations still are abundant, but the unity 
which once pervaded the field of religious studies until almost the end of 
the 19th centu1y is gone. Gone is that smug security that we know at least 
what the phenomenon meant we were talking about and that we had just 
to deal with a particular perspective sliced off from reality and to 
designate certain functions, structural regularities and other institutional-
ized categories to the manifestations of the "religious" dimension in man's 
life and in the history of mankind. To put "order into things" appears to 
many writers in this field today as a dead end of the endeavour. In its 
stead, several major and competing schools have arisen in philosophy 
each of which "explains the world" from a different basis. Yet, the 
reception of these different philosophical approahces into the field of 
religious studies has not resulted in a consolidation of the divergent 
methods and theories . Instead, each approach claims priority over any 
other; dogmatism and ossification have replaced the search for a possible 
compromise of divergent views. 
Each new approach seems to raise more questions than it is able to 
answer. This in itself might be conceived as a positive trait in the scholarly 
treatment of the subject matter, since it finally leads away from dogmatic 
security thus enabling the individual to be more open to multiple pos-
sibilities for viewing his personal existence in this world. But, of course, 
the contrary could and has been argued; an overabundance of choice 
leads to utter personal confusion. Yet, even assuming that we are 
confronted in the social life of the "average" person in industrialized 
societies with a continuing and accelerating tendency to individualization 
and secularization, as many evolutionary positivists have argued since 
the end of the 19th century, scholars are still divided whether this 
indicates an increase of individual maturity or whether it is to the contrary 
a sign of more confusion in the individual. 
Even these simple propositions about the social life cannot be solved 
unequivocally, because the scholarly community-in particular in the 
social sciences-does not seem to be "open to the world" anymore; each 
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question arising from the social reality is answered by "specialists" who vie 
for supremacy in regard to the explanatory power of their theoretical 
foundations. Positivism and Nco-Positivism fight against Hermeneutics, 
Dialectical Schools and Critical Rationalists don't talk to one another, 
and Phenomenology and Nco-Marxism cannot agree with any of the other 
protagonists; in short, none of the "popes" of the different schools- with 
very few notable exceptions-seems even to be willing to learn from the 
other.2 It should not surprise us then U1at the reception of the different 
approaches into the treatment of religious phenomena by social scientists 
has indeed led to utter confusion. 
AIMS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
In the following paper I do not presume to offer a new definition of 
religious pheonmena as such or to give answers to questions which the 
relevant authors have left open· it is rather an attempt to raise some 
further questions arising out of the particular field of comparative 
ethnographic research on the use of psychedelic agents among a varietx 
of societies and to show the possible implications for a comparative study 
of religions. I hope to show the potential gain that would result from a 
balanced application of divergent methods to a specific problem. My 
major proposition relates to the category of "religious experience" the 
neglect of which seems to have been the main reason for the stagnation 
in the treatment of religious phenomena in the social sciences. The 
concentration on this experiential dimension requires a survey of the 
historical roots of the dilemma. 
I propose then to show that the adherence to the stringent require-
ments and a priorj limitations of the subject rl}Jltter as imposed on the 
social sciences by their positivistic founders, Emile Durkheim and Max 
Weber, have impeded any progress toward a more inclusive treatment 
of the subject. I further propose to show that the method of one particular 
discipline within the social sciences, namely the central paradigm of 
'participant observation" as used by ethnographers or socio-cultural 
anthropologists, has the potential to enlarge U1e horizon of our under-
standing of the role of religious experiences in a comparative perspective. 
I also suggest that the application of this research method to related 
disciplines from psychology to sociology was not by mere accident. The 
reception of this method does not only coincide with particular develop-
ments in the attitudes of segments of U1e populace in industrialized 
societies namely the aspirations of the youth movement of the last 
decade; it also shows the resurgence of several older philosophical modes 
of approaching reality. Anthropologists seem on the whole to be those 
scholars who have constantly applied a method which was advocated 
for other fields of the humanities since the end of the last century, namely 
the hermeneutical point of view. This particular way of interpreting social 
facts through "empathetic understanding" grew out of the Neo-Kantian 
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debate and was modified by Dilthey and Weber for the study of history 
and sociology respectively, but it was not really taken seriously in those 
social sciences that turned toward empiricism.3 
However, the limitations of my paper should clearly be understood: 
on the genuinely recalcitrant subject of religion there cannot possibly be 
offered any comprehensive or balanced coverage of the sciences involved, 
in particular not in the field of the Experiential. The phenomena dealt 
with in this paper pertain to reports on the perception of different states 
of reality under the influence of psychedelic substances. The terminology 
contains many controversial concepts like "altered states of conscious-
ness" and one cannot possibly survey the literature that has accumulated 
on even the concept of "consciousness" alone. The introduction of the 
term "altered states of consciousness" into the literature immediately led 
to a widening of the concept to accommodate materials pertaining to the 
reaching of such states which are actually not drug-induced. 
Interpretations of these multi-faceted phenomena span the whole 
spectrum from anthropology to psychiatry, and from philosophy to 
neuropharmacology. Rather than surveying each field and its contributions 
separately, I will point to the differences and convergences in 
interpretation of the same phenomenon by the various disciplines. 
HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THE STAGNATION IN RELIGIOUS 
STUDIES 
Most prominent authors in the fields of the sociological and 
anthropological treatment of religion complain about the deficiencies 
concerning the results. A survey of these complaints seems to indicate 
a double contradiction; firstly, there is an abundance of competent studies 
on specific religious phenomena, but no concomitant theoretical progress 
for a general sociology is forthcoming; secondly, many writers in the social 
sciences still consider religion as a corner-stone for an adequate under-
standing of man's social life, but the many introductory text-books do 
not treat the subject in any but a perfunctory manner. Before I shall 
attempt to point to the roots of and the possible solution to this dilemma, 
I shall look at each of the two contradictions separately. 
In sociology the first contradiction has been hinted at by Luckmann 
and Berger respectively.4 Luckmann alludes that in spite of some tech-
nically competent studies on religious matters the field as a whole shows 
"the predominantly trivial character of the discipline".5 Luckmann in-
dicated that the theoretical paucity has largely to do with restricting 
the study of religious activities to institutionalized forms of behaviour, 
to the study of church-religions and denominations and their social 
relevance. Yet, I do not think that Luckrnann has put his finger on the 
real reason underlying the theoretical barrenness of the field. 
In the field of socio-cultural anthropology Luckmann's statement is 
supported by Clifford Geertz who said recently: "Two characteristics of 
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anthropological work on religion accomplished since the second world 
war strike me as curious when such work is placed against that carried 
out just before and just after the first. One is that it has made no 
theoretical advances of major importance. It is living off the conceptual 
capital of its ancc t rs, adding very little, save a certain empirical enrich-
ment, to il. The second is that it draws what concepts it does usc from a 
very nat'rowly defined. intellectual tradition."6 
To elucidate the second we find the following statement 
by Weston LaBarre: ... "the understanding of religion may be the key to 
an understanding f the nature and function of culture at large and hence 
the survival of our species .. .''7 Yet , as A .. C. Wallace ha indicated 
almost ten years ago, this insight of the importance of religious activities 
is not accompanied by a systematic treatment in basic text-books.B 
This situation has not changed in the leas-t. 
I think both contradictions have at their root the same problem. It is 
not so much the non-relevance of certain methods with which the field 
of religion is approached but rather the fact that sociologists and anth-. 
ropologist until recently have not asked the right questions. And only 
when we ask the right question does the problem of the appropriate 
metlwd emerge. The inability to ask the relevant and important question 
has to do with the strong adherence of most writers in the field, including 
those who were cited above, to the canon of restrictions imposed upon 
the social sciences by Durkheim and Weber. The relevant question to ask 
is the following: What is religions experience? 
We can then decide whether there are possible methodologies to 
elucidate this elusive category. Yet, both. Durkheim and Weber have 
excluded this question from the realm of the "proper" social sciences. 
Durkheim declared as legitimate objective for sociology the search for 
and explanation of social facts . Although he is aware of the importance 
of the experiential dimension of religion, he did only admit those factors 
to the realm of enquiry which could be objectified, observed and validated 
in some form of bio-social manjfestation such as rituals and myth or the 
socially relevant roles of religious practitioners. 
It is well known that Max Weber rejected-though with a different 
orientation than Durk.heim-the treatment of "religious experience" 
as legitimate pursuit of sociologists by insisting that any religious 
experience is irrational, and that the experience of the mystic, which is 
its supreme form, is incommunicable.9 
All assertions of Luckmann, Berger, Geertz or Wallace notwithstanding, 
it is evident that both sides, sociologists as weU as socio-cultural anth-
ropologists, are still "living off the theoretical capital" of Durkheim in 
particular. TI1e result is that most recent treatments of religious 
phenomena have become overly specialized or exhaust themselves in 
minute details, leaving us with a tremendous amount of empirical data, 
but also with the general impression of being insipid. To give but one 
example from the mentioned authors: Wallace equates what is focal 
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and important in religion with the social manifestation of ritual. He is 
as obsessed with "the smallest religious thing" as Marvin Harris once was 
with "the smallest cultural thing."lO As I have pointed out in a different 
place, I do not think that any advance in the social sciences will ever be 
made if we merely and repeatedly slice the cake thinner U1e ancient 
atomistic fallacy); raU1 er we may find ourselves in lhe midst of empirical 
"smallest" data going hungry for meaning.ll We may , for all we know, 
already be at the state of "being digested" by the data, instead of having 
sovereignty over the things". As Evans-Pritchard perceived the general 
malai e so cogently: 'It is a fact, which none can deny, that the 
theoretical capital on which antluopologists today live is mainly the 
writings of people whose research was entirely literary, who brought to 
bear great ability much learning and rigorous methods of cholar hip 
on what others had observed and rec rcled . When that capital is exhausted 
we are in danger of falling into mere empiricism, one field study after 
another adding to the number of known facts, but uninspired and un-
inspiring.' 12 
Instead of making the daring step to incorporate the category of 
"religious experience" into the not o sacred canon of social enquiry, 
we remain basically stuck with the unease of the state of affairs which in 
my opinion was in the field of religious studies most clearly felt b{ 
Jaocltim Wach. In the beginning of ltis Sociology of Religion Wach 1 
notes the great variability of the forms of religious experssion whkb is 
backed by comparative ethnographic da.la whicll were also the empirical 
background for Durkheim's studies. Wach says "Thus it has been demon-
strated that there is traceable through the whole history of worship an 
exceedingly intricate interplay between individual experience in religion 
and .the various forms of traditional expression , all of which is an essential 
part of the dynamics of religion. "14 Before going on to classify and 
typologize U1ese many forms of social expression of religious experience, 
Wach adds in a footnote the following comment on William James: "It 
is a serious shortcoming of William James' classic study ... that it con-
centrates exclusively on U1e subjective side, which can not possibly be 
fully comprehended except through an interpretation of the expressions 
which in turn fom1 religious experience. The search' for the 'original' 
experiences. . .becomes U1en identical with that for extremer forms; 
personal religion nakedly considered' is an abstraction without 
.reality ... " 15 
It is clear how much Wach agrees here with the stance of Durkheim 
as well as of Weber. It is quite surprising that Wach never came to the 
conclusion that under certain qualified conditions the categories of 
'religious experience" might be a' possible subject for sociology, since 
at the end of the said work he states: "However, the mistake must be 
avoided of defining religion iJl arb itrary fashion , in identifying it 
exclusively with ideas, rites, or institutions which are subject to change 
and transformation, instead of conceiving it as that profoundest source 
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from which all human existence is nourished and upon which it depends 
in all its aspects: man's communion with God."16 
The extent to which the positivist attitude- taken to extremes-
has also influenced the field of comparative religious studies and of 
theology may be gleaned from a comment of Lewis and Slater: "We are 
to be told how people bury their dead in different periods and places .. . , 
but what this carried with it further in the way of belief or inner ex-
perience is thought to be too treacherous a ground to venture upon."l7 
1 think it is time to rethink our position and to integrate the category 
of experience into the ft'eld of social and religious studjes, without 
necessarily throwil1g the results of a positivist sociology aside. After all 
even U1.e nee-pos itivist enterprise which insists on empirical proof for all 
our assertions has not achieved anything beyond a programmatic stage, 
as Kolakowski summarized it. lt was after all Max Weber who admitted 
that any decision as to the object of legi timate study is in itself 
'irrational". Since with the category of the ' religious" we are defmitely 
in the sphere of values, I thir1k positivism goes too far by excluding per se 
the whole of "experience' from sociological analysis. Lt is one 
thing to say that within the realm of the empirical sciences we cannot 
possibly have scientific normative ethics and- that is the memorable 
lesson from positivist thinking- that ultimate evaluative assumptions 
can only be arbitrary; it is somethmg quite different to say that we cannot 
touch the category of "religious experience" because it is non-trans· 
mittable .18 
I am quite aware that 1 have to communicate even within this category 
of the "experiential' if I want to relate its contents lo the outisde . But let 
us accept at first the antinomie of cognition wh.ich entails the paradox 
of having to talk about something whkh is supposedly incommunicabl.e. 
TI1is paradoxical ru1d maybe Quixotic search was phrased already by the 
mysticChuang Tzu : 'Where can I find a m:m who has forgotten words so 
[ can have a word with him? " l9 I shall try to show below that the whole 
ethnographic enterprise ltas, often wiUwut consciously admitting this in 
written reports, continued with its field-research by living exactly in that 
antinomie, namely to " participate" in a way of life and at the same time 
to "observe" it. We shall see whether the method of " participant ob· 
servation" opens a potentially new avenue to the understa11ding and 
interpreting of religious experiences. Before entering the discussion on 
the ethnographic approach I would like to outline some of the results 
that emerged from attempts to test psychologically Ule effects of psy· 
chedelic substances. 
THE TESTING OF EXPERIENCES UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
PSYCHEDEUC AGENTS 
The main property of all the substances labelled psychedelic by 
Osmond XI is an ability to enhance the response to different sensory 
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stimuli. These substances were at first labelled psychotomimetic or psy-
chotogenic because of their similarity to psychotic states. Included in 
the word hallucinogenic, or more commonly psychedelic, are all those 
agents which are either of chemical origin (LSD-25) or derivatives of 
plant substances; the plant-derivatives are generally now referred to as 
psychotropic (as for instance those of the fly agaric, peyote, 
ayahuasca or yage, ololiuqui and many others; in Central America alone 
more than one dozen of those plant derivatives are known to be used).ll 
These various substances, in particular the chemical derivatives, were 
taken by a high percentage of member of the so-called "counte r culture" 
in order to achieve "religious experience". 
Though many authors have claimed that indeed these substances do 
lead to ' religious and mystical" forms of awamness eVidence and proof 
for uch contents of the mind under the influence of psychedelics is 
extremely sparse.22 The primary difficu lty consists in the impossibility 
of delineating " religious experience". This difficulty in comparing 
contents of certain experiences exists not only within ne cultural realm 
as for instance the industrialised Euro-American, but is an even greater 
impediment for a cross-cuJ tural comparative approach, since we basically 
still rely on analogous interpretations when we use the reported ex-
periences of "classical mystics ' to determine what a religious experience" 
might or should contain . As long as no matrix of cognition for the 
ordering of reality in different cultures exists, the basic objection to all 
classificatory efforts does apply : nothing can emanate from a brain or a 
which was not there in the first place. In the alleged "religious" 
content and even in the motivation of members of the youth-culture 
to take psychedelic substances we might see nothing more than a feed-
back from reports and descriptions about what one should or ought to 
be looking for. In other words, if somebody has read and is familiar with 
the ' in-literature" on the subject, we can expect to find exactly the 
"required" symptoms thrown back at the researcher: the classical case 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This controversy is by no means settled. The most extensive and 
critical experiments were conducted by Pahnke23 and by Masters and 
Houston.24 Pahnke admitted that not all the symptoms of the ex-
perimental content under psychedelic influence are of a religious nature. 
He distinguishes five different orms of psychedelic experiences; the 
psychotic, psychodynamic, cognitive, aesthetic, and the transcendental or 
mystical one. For the latter, which is of interest here, he lists nine inter-
related categories as constituent criteria. These criteria are unity, trans-
cendence of time and space, deeply felt positive mood, a sense of sacred-
ness, noetic quality, paradoxality, alleged ineffability of the experience, 
transiency and persisting positive changes in attitudes and behaviour.25 
On the level of pure logical analysis this might actually not be sufficient 
proof at all, since parts of these criteria can be experience outside the 
religious realm and the listing of the said criteria in fact uses expressions 
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which are surely semantically ambiguous. Without taking up each of 
Pahnke's points, it might be of interest just to point to the dubiousness 
of his distinction between the category of the psychotic, when we 
compare it with the definition Rudolf Otto gave lhe qualities inherent 
in the supreme religious experience, namely that of the divine as the holy 
and numinous. 
Pahnke describes, as one of the symptoms for psychotic experiences, 
the feeling of fear. Otto has defined the experience of the holy expressedly 
as includjng elements of fear, of awe, of dread, of the uncanny and of that 
debilitating, panic-stricken state of awareness of the daimonjc powers 
of the deity which literally leads to paralysis of the body. 26 Might then 
not, we could ask, those symptoms which are associated with the category 
"psychotic' in fact be part of the expetience we would in Otto's terms 
call religiotrs"? 
A stronger doubt as to whether western subjects under the influence 
of psychedelic substances can have religious experiences was voiced by 
Masters and Houston: " ... we are certainly less exuberant than some other 
researchers when it comes to the question of U1e frequency of such 
(religious) experiences." And they add: "The difference .. .is one of 
criteria rather lhan of testimonial opulence".27 The difficulty is one of 
semantics, of social context and of presuppositions based on abstractions. 
A Masters and Houston point out: " ... a subject may have a eupho ria-
inducing experience of empathy with a chiar, a painting, a person or a 
shoe. This may result in protestations of tnUlscendental delight as chair, 
pajnting, person, a11d shoe are raised to platonic forms and the subject 
assumes him elf to be mystically enlightened. Too often in these and 
similar situations the guide will offer reassurance to the subject and so 
reinforce his belief that he is having a religious experience. "28 
These few examples of the almost unmanageable amount of literature 
on testing of psychedelic experiences may suffice to make my point 
clear: as long as we operate in Lhe dimension of descriptive categories 
of testimonies under guidance two criteria cannot be eliminated: one 
is the possible misinterpretation by the pre-conditioned guide (psy-
chologist experimenter etc.) and the other, and main problem, is the 
jmpossibiHty of real 'control" over the experience, as long as we are 
not sure whether the subject and the experimenter share the same 
universe of meaning and motivation and as long as the guide 
(experimenter) cannot "relive" the same experience. We arc left with 
the problem of the intersubjectivity of experience and the transferability 
of forms of perception which is a general stumbling block for any social 
interpretation of the meaning of bjects as well as of the meaning of the 
self as objectified personaJity vis-a-vis other individuals and the world 
outside. 
On the purely descriptive level of interpretation a solution to the 
Durkheimian dilemma seems impossible. Let us take an example from 
art-appreciation: it is patently fallacious to suggest that the tree I see in 
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a natural surrounding and the tree I paint have the same meaning. 
Likewise does the tree painted by Cezanne or van Gogh affect me in the 
same way as it did them? This depends not only on the idiosyncratic 
state of my cognitive-emotional setting as well as that of the painter, 
that is on the contextual criterium, but also on the intentionality with 
wi tb I see the object in questlon.29 
ANALYTIC DEFINITIONS OF ALTERED STATES OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
From the above described materials it may seem that tl1e overriding 
emphasis in most test-publications is related to the question of the dif-
ferent fom1s of reality perception Ul\der tJ1e influence f psychedelics. A 
considerable amount of literature, however, especially from comparative 
ethnography concerns the question of the adequacy of categories applied 
to a range f similar phen men a, as for instance possession states, states 
of ecstasy shamanism, trance, visions and other. These and other states 
of individual non-ordinary forms of awareness are not only , and not 
primarily, reached through chemico-botanical agents, but also through a 
great variety of form of psycho-mental and somatic manipulation, as for 
in tance fasting, meditation, breathing exercises and many others. 
Most of U1e comparative ethnographic literature in this field is still 
concerned with the purely classificatory exercise of such activities, with 
the concomitant intractability of the problems due to the application 
of purely analytical concepts imposed upon descriptive material. De-
pending on the inclination and theoretical bias of the autllOr, inter-
pretations of the data oscillate widely. Some rather misleading 
exaggerations appear about the primacy of several forms of manipulation 
as does U1e obsolete evolutionary debate on the "origins" of religion. 
Nevertheless, the analytic debate has shed some new light on an old 
question. The main debate was kindled by the re-interpretation of the 
ethnographic data on the phenomenon of 'shamanism' in the publications 
of Wasson.JO Wasson first p inted out that the ten prevailing inter-
pretation of shamanism in its original area of Siberian tribal was 
full of erroneous and selective i11terpretation of the relevant literature. 
He found ample evidence that shamans in fact took psychedelic agents 
for their ecstatic "trips" to the upper and lower worlds. This in itself 
and allied research on mushroom ingestion among Central American 
tribal groups, has thrown much light on the distribution of these practices 
and on the role of the shaman as prototype of the ecstatic psychopompos. 
But Wasson's claim that all religious beliefs and sentiments can finally be 
derived from the effects of mushrooms, is as misleading and unproductive 
as the opposite assumption held by Eliade that drug-induced states of 
ecstasy are only a "degeneration" of the original features of shamanism. 3l 
In the field of comparative studies several other attempts at defining 
these many different phenomena in an analytic and operationally useful 
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category have been undertaken. The most comprehensive definition of 
"Altered States of Consciousness" (ASC's) was introduced by Ludwig.32 
Clearly influenced by the classical works of descriptions of non-ordinary 
experiences by Bucke (1901), James (1902) and Huxley (!954) 33 Ludwig 
defined AS 's as mental states differing from alert, waking consciousness. 
He incorporates several forms of induction of such ASC's through phy· 
siological, psychological , or pharmacological manoeuvers or agents and 
arrives at his categorization of ASC's as result s of "reduction or increase 
of exteroceptive stimulation'; in this definition Ludwig combined the 
whole range of attempts at describing forms of sensory ' overloading" 
or "deprivation" of earlier Ilterature.J4 A different approach was that 
of Erika Bourgignon35 who separated naturalistic and supernaturalistic 
explanations for behavioural manifestations of trance of possession and 
of related phenomena according to native explanations.36 Bourgignon 
believes that the literature gives us clear-cut examples f naturalistic 
or supernatural explanations for trance states by native informants. 
She then divides the different trance states into those involving concepts 
of possession and those which do not involve such an explanation. 37 
TI1ough the attempt to differentiate these intricate phenomena is both 
laudable and scholarly , il should have been clear to Bourgignon that she 
is-even with the heuristic device of using native interpretations- really 
only playing with "ideal types". To make this point clear, one only needs 
to peruse the extensive ethnograph ic evidence on shamanism in Siberia: 
the shamans reported to a number of researchers that they become sick 
around puberty, that during this bouts of sickness a spirit appears 
ordering the boy to become a novice with a mature shaman. During their 
later self-induced trance states, in which they either encounter the super· 
natural agent in a sexual and spiritual union or go into the Lower worlds 
to fetch the souls of "sick" persons back, lhey are no longer "possessed" 
but, on the contrary, were in 'control" of the spirit-worlct.JB Tn 
Bourgignon 's categories reporting of sickness would then be "natural", 
the possession by the caiJing spirit 'supernatural" the inunature shaman 
would be 'posse sed", the mature shaman would be in control and induce 
the possession-like state? Thjs shows, sufficiently 1 believe, thallhe purely 
analytic categorisation of an activity or of the activities of one particular 
religi us role which has to be seen as a holistic unit, can only lead to an 
"estrangement" from the living reality of such activities. 
Another analytical approach is that of l.M. Lewis39 who goes beyond 
semantic issues and tries to develop a "sociology of ecstasy" by relating 
different froms of ecstatic behaviour to the socio-cultural settings. He 
differs from Eliade in this attempt insofar as he does not include any 
historical perspectives. Eliade states once: " . .. even lhe most eleva ted 
religiou expression (mystical ecstasy) . .. presents itsetr through specific 
structures and cultura.l expressions wltich are historically condilioned".40 
Lewis relates, in a very Durkheimian tradition of English social 
anthropology, the possible social functions of ecstatic states to phenomena 
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of different forms of inadequacies of roles or individuals in a particular 
socio-cultural system (deprived women or suppressed groups become 
visionaries and display ecstatic behaviour), or he correlates his so-called 
"morality-cults" with those ecstatic forms whose function is the main-
tenance of the existing social order. I do not want to quibble with Lewis 
about the usefulness of this approach, but I do insist that he has with aU 
the other mentioned analytic constructs in c mmon the deficiency of not 
taking into account the 11 experiential" dimension. Yet, in one respect 
Lewis transcends the traditional socio-cultural explanatory models wltich 
search merely for the functional correlation of social activities, by 
rejecting the traditionally strongly supp rted hypothesis that ecstatic 
states are comparable to pathogenic states.41 
CULTURAL VERSUS PSYCHIATRIC MODELS OF EXPLANATION 
Lewis opposed the claims of Bogoras (1907), Devereux (1956), and 
Krader (1954) among many others,4 2 that shamans are "insane". With 
this he refutes in toto the application of diagnostic terminologies derived 
from western cUnical psychology and traditional psychiatry. Insisting on 
the genuinely psychotherapeutic function f the shaman , Lewis interprets 
the disease phenomena positively as culturally conditioned ordeals of 
initiation which in most cases lead to controlled states of possession. He 
is here in agreement with a host of other aud1ors as for instance Eliade 
Shiro.kogoroff, Veith43 and in particular with Nadel. Nadel had long ago 
pointed out that native societies make a perfectly clear distinction 
between real sickness and divinely inspired possessions.44 
It is of interest here to note that in the field of psychiatry itself we find 
a rising opposition to the application of terms like "schizophrenia" etc., 
Ulat is, to the application of traditional medical terrnin logics to states of 
''deviance" from the "normal". This opposition is most clearly stated by 
Laing and Szasz who argue that , depending on the frame of reference, 
tl1e doctor might be considered the sick one from the patient's viewpoint. 
45 However, the main implication from the comparative studies on 
shamanism has, as far as 1 can discern from the literature, not yet entered 
U1e main-stream of the so-called "anti-psychiatric" movement: if I under-
stand their alms couectly, they are trying to locate (in a rather Nco-
Marxist fashion) the disease and its etiology not i11 the individual, but 
rather in the social conditions surrounding the individual. I11 other words 
tJ1ey con ider the society as sick. 
The really important inference to be drawn from the Siberian studies 
is that the shaman is defmitely a curer wh operates with the principle 
of putting himself into a like of sickness as Ius patient whose soul 
he tries t bring back. Put differently, we migl1t say that in order to cure, 
the healer makes himself sick to understand the etiology of the disease. 
111e relevance of this healing-principle to modern psychotherapy would 
be to gel rid of the age-old ada_ge that the doctor should not "infect" 
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himself with the disease and that he should not get "involved" in the 
menta l and psychological turmoil of his patient. Jn positive terms this 
means that the modem psychotherapist has to become involved and 
follow the maze-ways of the non-ordinary mind to be able to bring it back 
to this level of reality here and now. He has to try to play the role of the 
"psychopompos" , the leader of the soul, the "hermetic" guide. 
What surprises me, however, is that so many "transcultural 
psychiatrists" understand cultural variables and in particular the 
variability of the boundaries between genuine disease and inspired forms 
of behaviour. Many anthropologists on the other hand who are supposed 
to be well versed i11 cultural variability insist on seeing "sickness" io 
possession states. As Lewis said with appropriate indignation : "It is surely 
bizarre in the extreme to assess men tal health in terms of the incidence 
of syndromes in the healers rather than i11 their palients."46 Here are some 
examples of such invidious argumentation : Wallace uses the word 
"schizoid" to describe the shaman's identity reconstitution.47 Elsewhere 
he states "whereas the rituals of possession are directed toward hysteria, 
and the shamanic toward schizophrenia, the rituals of mysticism are 
focused on depression" .48 All impressive vocabulary indeed, but how 
meaningful is this transfering of western clinical terminology to people 
who live literally "world's apart"? Another misplaced application , based 
purely on speculation and embellished with psychjatric terminology, is 
given by Schwartz who recently stated that cargo-cults, and cults in 
general for that matter, are in part manifestations of a "paranoid ethos" 
which he thinks has permeated human behaviour since prehistoric times.49 
1 am in sympathy with the genera l trend of erasing the artificial boun-
daries between the different subfields of the social sciences, but certain 
analogies are not only misleading, they are downright dangerous in their 
implications; the carrying over of western psychiatric terminology into 
behavioural forms which are by native participants conceived as 
"religious" activities is but a new form of a colonial and im-
perialistic mentality .50 J think a discussion of this unwarranted applica-
tion of preconceived disease descriptions does not even merit further 
comment. 
Yet, a more subtle form of the argument has been introduced by the 
social philosopher Topitsch.51 He indicated that the condition of in-
toxication through psychotropic agents as well as the rise of messianic 
movements with their expectat ion for immediate, this-wordly salvation 
have one criterium in common, namely they are mecJ1anisms of escape 
from the existing reality. Topitsch has gone so far as to call this 
escapism a form of "alienation" , by which he seems to mean a with· 
drawal from the existence in the day to day activ1ties.52 1 thll1k tJ1is is 
a rather dubious proposition. If we can reduce "alienation" to purely 
social conditions then sociology is all we need to solve lhe problem. 
This would, as Petrovjc has pointed out , leave no place for a phHosophical 
anthropology. If alienation is not understood as a complex of social 
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conditions, but as an immanent part of man's existence through his being 
conscious and able to reflect, objectify and internalize (a proposition 
which is shared by very divergent philosophical movements, from Chdstian 
theology to Max Scheler,S3 from Karl Marx to Psychoanalysis) then it 
should have occurred to Topitsch to ask why aU these efforts to reach an 
"altered state of consciousness" might be exactly contrary to his im-
putation. That is, these are not symptoms of a sick form (in BlelJier's 
psychological terms which Topitsch is relying on)54 of alienation, but are 
rather an attempt to "overcome" this alienation which seems to haunt 
man in his waking consciousness where he is always "split off" from his 
objects, from himself and from his own objectified consciousness. The 
only way Topitsch could possibly have argued logically would l1ave been 
to say that, until other evidence is forthcoming, the self-induced and 
sought after "altered states of consciousness" are but an extension of the 
''normal" forms of alienation. 
THE CENTRAL ETHNOGRAPHIC PARADIGM AND ITS RESULTS 
Before discussing the central ethnographic paradigm I would like to 
summarize the main points established in the previous discussion. First, 
the founders of sociology were aware of the fact that there are indeed 
"experiences" beyond the ordinary world-perception. However, the 
sociologists and anthropologists with their Durkheimian or Weberian 
restrictions were not able to approach the level of "consciousness'' and 
its contents per se, since hey were bound by the dictum of socially 
manifested and perceivable activities based on symbollc representations. 
Second, the purely analytic attempts of comparing different mechanisms 
with which man has-tried to achieve "altered states of consciousness" have 
done not much more than to prove to us the widespread usage of psyche· 
delic substances and other forms of psycho-somatic manipulations of the 
mind. These analytic re-appraisals of the already known literature and of 
known activities have rectified certain misinterpretations for activities such 
as shamanism or medieval witch-craft. Third, the clinical psychological 
attempts of testing the content of experiences in drug-induced states 
have not been able to prove to us that a religious experience does not 
in fact take place. Fourth. one positive point has emerged from the 
renewed discussion of cross-culturally evident practices to reach different 
states of consciousness; the application of derogatory terms of "deviance" 
to activities of a different order has been eliminated from the psychiatric 
vocabulary. 
The only way open to the researcher to approach the experiential 
qualities of another person or group seems to be through the application 
of a method which consciously searches out those experiential dimensions 
and tries to "relive" them. It is this method which has been for some 
time what I would label the central paradigm of ethnography. 5 With the 
method of participant observation most ethnographers are confronted 
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wilh a 'different reality" than the traditional sociologist: the sociologist 
perates in a field of social relations , activities and values of which 
him elf is part and about which he has therefore a 'precognition" acquired 
tlnough hi own s cializati n-pro ess; the same would apply to the 
western psycho! gi t and psychiatrist. In other words, the traditional 
sociologist is at a di ad van tagc in regard to his research object: he knows it 
too well he is part of it , and he cannot see the "non- bviousness" of 
tfljngs which appear "obvious" to him. 
By contrast the anthropologist in field-work is confronted with a more 
favourable and at the same time also more rurficult itualion. More 
favourable, because the "diffe rence " of a foreign culture stjck more 
clearly out. More difficult because in order to under tand the foreign, alien 
universe of meaning, its symbol and their expre i n in ocial life, the 
field-worker is caught in Lhe dialectic which Simmel so clearly pointed out 
for the situation of the "stranger". The ethnographer ha as Afred chutz 
57 once said to learn to walk and talk again as if he were a baby. The 
anthr pologist a field-worker has taken up a his main meth dological 
premise what Dllthey and others required from the historian and Weber 
by the category of erstehen' from the sociologist. All etJmographers 
subscribe to the definition by Iiade for the histCJrian of religion: " ... he 
is fo.rced in his hermeneutical endeavour t 'relive' a multitude of exis-
tential situations . . . 01e) ... ca nnot ay ... that he has understo d the 
Australian religl ns if he has n t underst od the AustraiJan's mode f 
being in the world''.5 
Yet, there ex.ists an imp rtant differen e between the sciences of 
hi tory and sociology and that of etlm graphy: whereas historians and 
oU1er humanists as well as s ciologists have either a pre-knowledge about 
the "object" or are nly irritated by the problem of the communicability 
of the individual process of 'reliving" U1e ethnographer encounters this 
dialectical antinomie in his day-to-day living in the alien culture. Tile 
ethnograph er is not only, if he is worth !tis salt , intellectually involved 
with Lhis problem but he is ften forced to live with it; it becomes an 
'existential" condition for the oflen dreary process of what is 
euphemistically circumscribed a "data-collecting". ·n1is requires !he 
mental ability constantly to change from involvement to reflection. I 
once put the ethnographer's dilemma thus: 'The observer qua participant 
has to step ut of his 'Lebenswelt" in order to understand live in and 
record the world of the observed subje.cts ("the native" and thi ob· 
serving and recording has to be done in te rms of the observed culture or 
person, without the researcher being or becoming really native himself."59 
It goes witlwut saying that L1is particular stance is in itself a value-
orientation, but no more so than any other f rm of problem solving; 
as T pointed out above, whether I profess to be a positivist an empirio-
criticist, a critical rationalist or a New-Marxist, I commit myself a priori 
to a stance for or gainst the rational enterprise of science itself to include 
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or to exclude the stud_> of certain phenomena and to choose the 
appropriate methodology. As Weber once said: "(From this) it does 
not follow that the cultural sciences too can only lead to results that are 
subjective in the sense Lha l lhey are valid for one person, but not for the 
second. What changes is more the degree of intere t in them by one or 
anotJ1er person. In words: what will be object of research .. .is 
determined by the values that rule a researcher and his time".60 
l11e ch ice the anthropologi 1 a fieldworker has made is basically one 
of using the "hermeneutical" method. As Lhe word implies it i a method 
of "interpretation", "guidance', Ver tchen''- the interpretation of and 
the guidance through the maze-ways of a Slrange and different perception 
of the w rid a it is shared by members of another society. One of the 
preconditions for thi is the proccs of a "relearning", which implies that 
tJ1e ethnographer qua participant has to try to forget his own conditioning 
and that when he report he has to suspend his judgement. This is the 
famous stance of • epoche which the cia sica! school of scepticism 
advocatcd .61 The word 'epoche connotes ".holding to oneselr' , 'to 
abstain" 'to keep to oneselr . As Kant nnulated it in cogent clarity: 
"Voluntarily. to preserve one's self in suspe11sion judicii, is te. timony to 
a great intellect and it is so extremely difficult, because preferences tend 
to meddle immediately wi lh the judgement of reason ".62 
However, I do not conceive of hermeneutical methodology as an 
antithesis to empirical research methods. The sceptical stance of the 
ethnographer impHes the achieving of an "equilibrium between ethno· 
centrism and alienation, by balancing the mind between passion and 
epoche" , as 1 said in another place.63 Kant already saw that the sceptical 
attitude which is not without that passion inevitable in any participation 
and internalization does not imply the abandoning of rational goals. He 
insisted that scepticism represents the foundation as well as the aim of 
the application of the faculty of reason. This means for Kant that reason 
itself requires an awareness of its own metaphysical notions which should 
not be taken too seriously . And this, according to Kant, can only be 
achieved when we take experience as the measuring rod for knowledgc.64 
It is therefore only to be expected that anthropologists with their 
insistence on the importance of "participant observation" as their main 
tool of the lrade would also venture into the rea lm of experiential states 
'Of a religious nature as supremely embodied in t.he shaman's form whose 
role is sanctioned and acknowledged by the collectivity as being endowed 
with non-ordinary knowledge. 
The question remains: can there be a bridge between culturally and 
personally mediated forms of non·ordinary experiences or have we to give 
up this endeavour as fruitless because we would only commit the mistake 
of lifting certain facts out of their social etting?65 The only sound way 
to achieve this in my opinion is by a twofold operation: to combine the 
phenomenological "art" of "bracketing" (Husser!) with the hermeneutical 
procedure of transmitting the experience. Bracketing implies here the 
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suspension of one's own judgement on .the experience itself, and the her· 
meneutical approach en tails the retelling of the experience without dis-
tortion from the standpoint of" distance". 
This done, one would then need to re-in traduce the culturally specific 
variable to find out in what way the personal experience (Erlebnis) sur-
passes the specific socio-cultural restraints and whether we can in the 
empirical sciences ultimately try to supp rt the notion of a "psychic unity 
of mankind" (Bastian, C.G. Jung) or at leas l of the content of certain 
"role-experiences" (of the shaman, the sorcerer, the psychopompos the 
mystic). The leas t result we could hope for would be an insight into the 
poten Lial of man's capacity experientially to find a foundation of his-
being·in·1lle·world in the analytically proposed or dogmatically asserted 
"sacredness" of hisself and the world he lives in. 
ll is with these reservations and far-reaching implications for the 
epistemology of any comparative science of mon that we should try to 
understand the approach of those younger anthropologists who participate 
in the experiences of people who consciously enter a "different real.ity" 
through the taking of psychotropic substances. As Michael J. Herner 
pointed ut: 11 Undoubtedly ne of the major reasons that anthropologists 
for so long underestimated the importance of hallucinogenic substances 
i11 shamanism and religious experience was that very few had partaken 
themselves of the na tive psychotropic materials (od1er than peyote) or 
had undergone the resulting subjective experience, so critical, perhaps 
paradoxically, to an empirical understanding of their meaning to the 
peoples dtey studied" .66 
It would be beyond the purpose of this essay to comment on the 
manifold different results which have come from the diverse studies on 
primarily Sout h American cultures. The basic points which become clear 
seem to be that the taking of psychotropic substances occurs regularly 
and the whole communities share the experience together. In most com-
munities the "experience of the different reality", the world of the 
"spirits", the encounter with the "divine'' i taken as the "real world". 
All studies bear out that the individual who feels in tune with the cosmic 
forces, has a strongly expressed belief of a communion with the piritual 
world. Further genera l conclusions can be drawn from various reports 
as to the content of the experience, the social setting and the interaction 
between the community and the shaman who acts as guide and counsellor 
in the shared experience.67 
Firstly, the purpose of entering into the "separate reality'' of the spirits 
seems t be culture-specific. In some instances the aim is to heal a sick 
individual, to ftnd the source of the disease, to identify the object or 
person causing the illness and to neutralize the evil agent. In other 
instances the shaman is expected to aJJeviate symptoms which cause 
anxiety to a whole community, to identify and neutraHze or to battle with 
forces in the "other reality". fn cases the shaman seems to play the 
role of coalescing the community feeling to provide security and to 
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reiterate the continuity of the society's existence. The threatening forces 
are often perceived as being sent from the real of the "beyond" in a 
double sense: the beyond is not only the other reality, the abode of 
spiritual forces, it is also the evil from beyond the boundaries of the 
special social group, from the "enemy". Here the entering of the spirit 
world by all members of the community leads to an assertion of the 
basically "ethnocentric" world-view of each ethnic group. 
Both aims, the removal of an individual evil and of identifying the 
source of threat towards the community tell us something important 
about the shaman's position: the shaman is of a different order in the 
social and spiritual hierarchy because he controls the individual and the 
community. People believe in his extraordinary powers to control the 
spiritual world and therefore he is not only the psychopompos for the 
individual but is also the pointer for communal action. Whether the 
shaman can be considered a kind of native "psychoanalyst" remains a 
controversy in the literature.68 Dobkin de Rios pointed out that what is 
in classical Freudian terminology referred to as the transference between 
patient and curer does not occur in the case of ayahuasceros in the 
Peruvian slum communities.69 
The main difference between the two processes has been hinted at by 
several writers on the subject, 70 but all of lhem seem to agree that the 
shaman is the one who speaks, whereas the psychoanalyst is the one who 
listens. As Munn reported from participation in the "mushroom 
experience" among the Mazatecs: "At times it is as if one were being told 
what to say for the words leap to mind, one after another, of themselves 
without having to be searched for: a phenomenon similar to the automatic 
dictation of the surrealists ... "71 Munn describes in detail the poetic 
and oratorical skills displayed by shamans in session. 
The important question which arises here has to do not only with the 
role of the transference of symbolic meaning, but rather with the mani-
pulation of language: Who manipulates what? As Munn reports, the 
utterances of the shaman are done in a form which suggests that he is not 
really the one who speaks. All invocations end with the epithet "says"· 
like, "there is the terror, says" .72 Munn comments: "the words with 
which he (the shaman) states what .his work is indicate a creative activity 
neither outside of the realm of reason or out of contact with reality ... 
Reality reveals itself through him in words as if it has found a voice to 
utter itself. "73 
This reveals to us indeed a very important dimension of the shaman's 
powers and abilities which puts him into the category outside that of the 
western psychoartalyst and nearer to the western view of a poet. As 
Heidegger expressed il on several occasions: "Man only speaks when he 
re-presents language. Language speaks."74 The poet is the one who uses 
language in a particular way, or, to stay with Heidegger's idiom, thcough 
the poet the language speaks in a particular way to us: language condenses 
reality (the German verbal infinitive dichten, meaning "to create poetry", 
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is connected by Heidegger with the infinitive verdiclzten, which means 
"to condense something" .)15 
However, as long as the western psychoanalytic techniques do not 
become forms of "speaking" on the side of the "guide", a compar_ison 
of the two roles seems not yet timely. As Jacques Lacan, the pioneer of 
the combination of structural linguistics with psychoanalysis, says: '' ... 
how cou ld a psychoanalyst of today not realize that his realm of truth 
is in fact the word, when his whole experience must find in the word alone 
its instrument, its framework, its material, and even the static of its un-
certajn ties." 76 
At first sight, it appears as if the general conclusi n we are able to draw 
from a comparison of the ethnographic literature on "altered states of 
consciousness" under the application of psychotropic agents, with re-
searchers as participants, does not surpass the traditional framework of 
sociological interpretations of religious experiences. Structures and 
functions of psychedel.ic sessions seem to be context-oriented, boxed into 
culturally specific categories. Sifting through the reports on the contents 
of the experiences of South American Indians under the influence of yage, 
Harner comes to the preliminary conclusion that even the similarities 
in the images seem to be attributable to the regularities of the tropical 
rain forest environment which provides the natural basis for the culturally 
symbolized world of the native's mind.71 More vcr the role of the shaman 
seems to be one of coping with the exigencies of the situation at hand 
(curing, divining, healing indjviduals or enhancing the general communal 
en e against the hostile outside world.) 
Yet, l thjnk, these studies show ·certain implications for the under-
standing of the category of the religious in general, and for the role of the 
shaman in particular, which surpass the ordinary sociological and an-
thropological interpretations. Firstly, 1 would suggest that instead of 
purely concrete ocio-cultural acts, as for instance certain rituals as the 
foundation for individual and social cohesion many societies conceive 
the ultimate existential ground ing of individual and collective "health" 
in the personal encounter with the numinous forces of the world beyond 
the reaches of U1e waking con ciousncss. 
Secondly, the 'other reality" is not an illusory ne, but is "real 'in 
the sense of being endowed with powers that can be tapped and com-
municated with, to a degree by everybody and that have an effect on 
ordinary life. Instead of talking about God the participant speaks with 
Him.78 11te idea of the unity of man with his natural surrounding, and 
of his oneness with the inanimate w rld as well as with the "supeTl1atural" 
and with his self, leads to a disappearance of the dichotomy naturefculture 
as well as that of naturalfsupematura/. TI1e feeling of the convergence of 
"coincidence of opposites ' is not illusory and cannot arbitrarily be desig-
nated by us as hallucinatory . As Munn says "To call such transcendental 
experiences of light, vision, and speech hallucinatory is to deny that they 
are the revelations of reality" _79 
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Yet, we might say that there exists a hierarcy of power. Not everybody 
can manipu late the divine forces of the "o ther reality". Tltis implies, 
thirdly, that shamans are more than mere conjurers, tTicksters, "primitive" 
healers who respond to the needs of the individual or the community. 
He is a vessel for the universal powers, he guides the member of tl1e 
community through U1.e perils of the beyond , he is in partiClllar a person 
who has mytho-poetic qualities· he forms myth, he creates the words, 
lte speaks, he opens the communication channels to the divine, or, in 
other words: the divine speak through him, through l1is language and 
the divinity reveals itself to him and through him in language. I cannot 
agree with van der Leeuw who says: 'The mystic Is distinguished from 
primitive man . .. (by his ability) not only to transform everything from 
the outside to the inside but also to make everytlting inner into 
'objectified things'. 80 On the contrary 1 would say that the native, 
in the role of the shaman, is the mystic par excellence. The shaman has 
the ability of the artist to show to others that the "things in. themselves" 
do mean something 'o ther' (for lieidegger an art work is always 
"allegorical" in its aim , from the Greek 'a/lo agore6ei").Bl l11e shaman 
does not only create his and the community's reality by naming it U1rough 
language and by closing the gap between the 'harsh reality" of daily 
troubles through reference to and introduction in to the 'real' world of 
the divine; he also has to "see" before he can speak, as the mystic 'sees 
with closed eyes" (the meaning of the Greek word • myein '). The 
individual who can heal the "alienation" of other members of the com-
munity has to possess Ute p wer of "seeing" the possibility of a recon-
ciliation between aspiration and reality and has then to make visible for 
others the oneness of man and cosmos, of culture and nature. 
ls there a way to penetrate this form of world-perception, to get an 
empatheLic understanding of the method of 'seeing" as achieved by the 
shaman and to transmit this mode of perception to the reader tlu·ough 
participant observation? 
THE HERMENEUTIC GUIDANCE INTO THE MIND OF A SORCERER 
The finest attempt at describing the mental world of a native shaman 
(a Yaqui 'brujo ') comes s far from Carlos Castaneda's ethnographic 
work_82 Castaneda was for many years the disciple of a brujo and tried 
to "relive" how the "sorcerer' experiences and orders the "other reality". 
Castaneda describes step by step how the quest for power (seeing) is 
undertaken by a man of knowledge (sorcerer) and how tl1e brujo con-
structs, orders maintains and controls the universe of those powerful 
spiritual entities with which the cosmos is filled. The importance of 
Castaneda's descriptions lies not primarily in reports on the intricacies 
of the spiritual geography of a sorcerer, but in the method of transmitting 
this personal and individual quest aJld the "expe1ience of the separate 
reality" of the sorcerer through the device of a description of his own 
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Castaneda's, experience of that reality. Castaneda describes his own 
approach in the !lowing words which have a definite ring of Husserl's 
method of phenomenological 'bracketing": Obviou ly ... any event 
that occurred within this alien system f sensible interpretation could 
be explained or understood only in terms of the unit of meaning proper 
to that system. This work is, therefore a reportage and should be read 
as a reportage. The system l recorded was incomprehensible lo me, thus 
the pretense to anything other than reporting ab ul it would be misleading 
and impertinent".83 
astanecla brackets competently insofar a he does not make many 
comment we woult.l expe t in an ordinary ethnography; there are no 
indications as to the ocial frame of reference the cui! ural milieu or the 
role f the brujo in hi own s ciety. Yet Ca taneda cannot completely 
exclude all personal intcrpretali ns. By b th describing his own 
experience and discussing these then with the orcerer by asking the 
sorcerer whether he has "seen" the right or expected or the same Utings 
as the sorcerer and by additional ly relating U1e often puzzling and 
paradoxical answers of the sorcerers, astaneda lets the reader be the third 
party in a multi-dimensional game of feed-back processes. 
The orcerer's paradoxical answers to ''rati nal" questions to 
"validate' experience!) have incidentally a strong resemblance to the 
puz.zles of the mystics of other areas and times (in particular to some 
Taoi t and Zen tatements). This dialogue between the "rational" 
researcher and the 'nonsense speaking" orcerer, whereby the latter 
nevertheless finally succeeds with his techniques in "conditioning" 
Castaneda to "see" himself, holds for the reader a dazzling fascination of 
the contradictions between illusion and reality. For instance, when 
Castaneda encounters his "guardina" to the gates of knowledge in the 
form of a gia11t and asks the sorcerer how to elicit the help of this "giant' 
guardian, the sorcerer answers that what astaneda perceived to be a gia11t 
was really a grasshopper.84 
Castaneda's phenomenological and hermeneutical reports could 
certainly be used by a traditional "theory-builder" to "invent" the 
elaborate universe of lhe brujo's structure of the "separate reality" for 
so-called "scientific" purposes. Yet, it is here that the sorcerer himself 
destroys our illusion (and Castaneda's) that we can complete!>· relate to 
or transmit the experience of the other rea lity of an altered state of 
consciousness, saying: "You really know how to talk and say nothing, 
don't you?. . .I have told you you have to have an unbending intent 
in order to become a man of knowledge. But you seem to have an un-
bending intent to confuse yourself with riddles. You insist on ex-
plaining everything as if the· whole world were composed of things 
that can be explained. Now you are confronted with the guardian and 
with the problem of moving by using your will. Has it ever occurred to 
you that only a few things in this world can be explained your way ... ?85 
TI1at implies that neither Castaneda nor we as readers can really 
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"relive" the experience of the brujo by employing "our language". Never-
theless, the degree to which this is possible through participant 
observation, is proved by Castaneda's own attempt and his reporting about 
it. He himself was obviously successful (maybe otherwise we would have 
no report on it?) in a personal way, and the attempt itself is insofar 
validated in the eyes of the sorcerer, as the sorcerer himself took the 
researcher on not only as a disciple but actually guided him on the "trip" 
to achieve knowledge. The main value of Castaneda's description wouJd 
therefore lie in the validation of our belief in the anthropological method 
of "participant observation" and in the hermeneutical endeavour. 
I think that there is at least one further important message in the 
reports of Castaneda which we should heed. It is the warning that not all 
methods or techniques to attain an "altered state of consciousness" are 
sui ted for everybody and certainly not everybody is able to attain "know-
ledge" in the sense of the mystical "seeing". As the sorcerer indicates, 
the search for the powers of the separate reality is really more than a mere 
exercise in the intellectual game of hermeneutical procedures: it is a game 
beyond words and one of life and death. These are the words of the brujo 
to Castaneda (to us): "We are different, you and I. Our characters are not 
alike. Your nature is more violent than mine ... My benefactor said that 
when a man embarks on the path of sorcery he becomes aware, in a gradual 
manner, that ordinary life has been forever left behind; that knowledge 
is indeed a frightening affair; that the means of the ordinary world are no 
longer a buffer for him; and that he must adopt a new way of life if he is 
going to survive ... By the time knowledge becomes a frightening affair 
the man also realizes that death is the irreplaceable partner that sits next 
to him on the mat. Every bit of knowledge that becomes power has 
death as its central force. Death lends lhe ultimate touch, and whatever 
is touched by death indeed becomes power."86 
CONCLUSION 
I think we can draw several very general conclusions about the 
possibility of studying religious phenomena in the realm of "experiences" 
and about the potentially useful methods of how to go about it, from the 
previously presented materials. These conclusions have not only some 
importance for the problem at hand, namely the elucidation about the 
occurrence of altered states of consciousness, but are of value for the 
general problem of approaching and understanding human experience in 
a non-ordinary context (as which the scientific view of the world itself 
could be perceived). 
My first conclusion concerns the problem of epistemology of the 
scientific enterprise itself. As Husserl once said: "Every experience is ... 
not only characterized by the fact that it is consciousness, but it is simul-
taneously determined by the intentional object whereof it is a conscious-
ness."87 As we saw, several early authors from WilUam James onwards, 
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have tried to approach and explain the phenomenon of "religious ex-
perience' . Yet these forays have been ignored or even declared as non-
admissable by the founders of the soci logical tradition. Durkheim as well 
as Weber declared the category of the experiential as lying outside the 
realm of sociological enquiry proper. This commitment to a particular 
"paradigm" has in the words of Thomas Kuhn produced an apparent 
consensus from which a particular research tradition has continued.88 
However, as the many allempts at a re-interpretation of religious 
phenomena in the last decade seems to indicate there exists a general 
dissati faction in the social sciences with the estabHshed traditional canons 
of interpretation.89 But most approaches seem just to be more or less 
successful attempts at propping up lhe established paradigm. What was 
therefore needed was the introduction of a new question or in the words 
of Kuhn : ' ... since no paradigm ever solves all the problems it defines and 
since no two paradigms have all the same pr blems unsolved, paradigm 
debates always involve the question: "Which problems i it more significant 
to have solved?"90 And as Kuhn quite correctly implies this question 
can only be answered by criteria that lie outside the normal science 
altogeU1er. 
As I proposed above, the introduction of an important 'outside" 
factor , admittedly as "irrational" as any such decision, is the question 
of the relevance and the content of "religious experience". The evidence 
I introduced proved that there is already a paradigm implicitin one branch 
of the social sciences which has been applied for some time to approach 
social reality from an experiential point of view: the paradigm of par-
ticipant observation of the ethnographer. Using this parlicular view of 
reality and applying it to a specific problem, would therefore lead to see 
the familiar phenomenon in a "new gestalt ', as Kuhn has termed it.91 
Instead of throwing out the problem of religious experience itself, it only 
needs an additional poirrt of view how to appr ach it. With this I do not 
imply to throw out all the other paradigms; instead a combination of 
different methods developed and btainable from different 
'paradigmatic" world-views might open the way to a wider understanding 
of theca tegory of religious experience. 
Jf I may use the language of the Yaqui orcerer in a metaphorical 
sense: there are many separate realities of lhe category 'religious 
experience". There exists one level which pertains to the individual, the 
non-reducible "idio yncratic' experience of one particular person; the 
second level is that of the social framework and the culturally specified 
role of the person undergoing t11e experience; and third there is the level 
of the whole of mankind, of man as bio-physical and natural entity . Ac-
cording to these- minimally abstracted- three universes of reference, the 
religious experience should therefore be approached with at least three 
different categories of method. 
As to the first universe of reference, the individuaJ one, 1 think that 
the approach of participant observation, which we considered as the basic 
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ethnographic paradigm, is the most useful tool. This method coincides 
with what has been called the hermeneutical perspective; this perspective 
considers Verstehen as the adequate form for the empathetic reliving of 
human actions from the inside. As with most paradigms, this one has often 
been vastly overrated. I do not share the ambitious declarations of 
Droysen92 who considers hermeneutical understanding superior when 
compared with empirical forms of explanation. I certainly do not agree 
with Gadamer who wants hermeneutics to become the queen among 
methods and the supreme form for a philosophical 
world-interpretati n.93 However I do not think that the biting criticism 
which 1-lans Albert applied to the whole hermeneutical field by labellinj 
it the handmaiden of theology (in the normative-dogmatic sense),9 
is really called for. The acceptance of the ethnographic paradigm of 
participant observation by many other social sciences seems to indicate 
that, notwithstanding the controversy concerning the objectivity of this 
process, the hermeneutical approach can indeed con tribute to a wider 
understanding of the category of the Experiential. Hermeneutics in 
combination with the phenomenological exercise of 'bracketing" insures 
us that the intrusion of unwarranted evaluations of the experiential 
dimension is at least checked to Lhe degree to which this possible in-
trusion is made overtly known and is reflected upon. As Karl Mannheim 
stated: "It is clear, . .. that every social science diagnosis is closely 
connected wiU1 the evaluations and unconscious orientations of the 
observer and that the critical selfclarification of the social sciences is 
intimately bound up with the critical selfclarification of our orientation 
in the everyday world. "95 
As to the second universe of reference, it seems clear that the different 
methods of the empirical social sciences are of great value in giving the 
subjective experience some basis to stand on, a frame of reference outside 
the inner dimension of the individual. Only after we have placed the 
idiosyncratic experience of a particular role like that of the shaman in 
its cultural and social milieu, can we even begin to look for cross-cultural 
similarities of role-experiences in order to approach the controversial 
questions of particular universal characteristics as to their function, 
structure and meaning (as for instance the search for archetypes etc.). Tiiis 
second frame of reference might at some level of analysis open the 
possibility to not only clarify but also to correlate two of the most con-
troversial and nebulous concepts that pertain to all three universes of 
reference, namely those of the "collective representations" or collective 
consciousness (Durkheim) and of the "collective unconscious" (Jung). 
The combination of both techniques, of the experien tiaJ and of the in-
trinsically socio-cultural approach, have already led to a new perception 
of known phenomena. The reliving of altered states of consciousness 
and the hermeneutical description of such experiences tluough astaneda 
have given rise to the re-evaluation of the shamanistic phenomenon and 
with it a rethinking of our own categories of psych omen tal diseases; 
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at the same time , the opinions held dear by many historians about the 
unfoundedness of experiences reported by people who were accused of 
witch-craft in medieval times have definitely and irreversably been 
shaltered.96 
As to the third level of reference , I do not agree with the classical 
sociological paradigm that social facts can only adequately be explained 
by methods taken from U1e very social facts or from social actions ob-
servable in their conccrte settings.97 This is a logically circular argument; 
moreover, the maintenance of the demarcation lines between humanities 
(inclucling the social sciences) and the natural sciences has become un-
tenable. To understand fully the phenomenon of religious experience, and 
to find out that psychedelic substances of similar content can have any 
effect on the neuro-physiological system of U1e species man the disciptines 
of etltnobotany, biochemistry, psychopharmacology and neuro-physiology 
have been of i11 dispensable assistance. 
Yet, there is no need to go o far as to reduce every individual or 
socially mediated activity of body or mind lo bio-chemica l, physical or 
environmental regularities. This has been and still is the basic 
programmatic stance taken by certain behaviourists in the UnHed States 
as well as in Russia (if Skinner and Luria can be considered as 
representatives of these divergent streams of materialistic- reductionist 
point of view). Yet , we can no longer accept the opposite notion that man 
understands his own creations (society and history) better than he does 
nature, because man did indeed create Ius own socio-cultuJal as well as 
his psycho-mental activities but djd not have a hand in creating U1e 
natural universe. This was the challenge thrown in to the face of those who 
tried to apply natural science methods to lhe universe of reference of the 
social and individual realms, the first time by the largely neglected 
Giambattista Vico.98 l think a middte way between the opposites of 
purely cultural versus purely natural explanations of man 's activities is 
offered by re-interpretations of Marx' writings by several so-called Neo-
Marxists . A Petrovic has pointed out so clearly , Marx saw man as 
belonging to two realms at the same time: man is part of nature, yes; but 
man is also more than just a natural being, he is the being that can 
transcend the restrictions imposed by nature.99 It is here that Marx 
c mes nearest to the posi lion taken by Max Scheler and the 
representatives of a philosophical anthropology as for instance Arnold 
Gehlen. To quote Scheler: "The spiritual being, then, is no longer subject 
to its drives and its environment. Instead, it is 'free from U1e 
environment', or, as we shall say , 'open to the world ' ".JOO 
My second conclusion is that comparative ethnographical research and 
the rational-critical analysis of such materials has shown, that a 
transference of specific techniques from one society to another is not 
always possible. ln the case of altered states of consciousness and the 
category of religious experience of shamans the limitations of transference 
have clearly emerged. TI1e [ears expressed in parts of dogmatic theology, 
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whkh were at the same t ime the hopef of the "counter-culture", namely 
that psychedelics would open the way to "instant communion with the 
sacred cosmos" or even a domination over that "separate reality" 
(anticipated by the exaggerated claims of such writers as Alan Watts or 
Timothy Leary), 101 have proved overly optimistic, or pessimi lie, 
respectively. As studies on shamanism have indicated , there are ways of 
communion with the spiritual world which are accessible to the 
collectivity; but as much as there exist power-hierarchies in the social 
world, so do we find power-hierarchies of controlled access to the spiritual 
reality. Not everybody is chosen to see, to speak and be blessed to become 
the vessel of the divine word, or to heal society and the individual by re· 
uniting man and nature. 
As van Gennep originally showed, and recent studies by Turner support 
the evidence, 102 most native societies have very elaborate rituals of 
initiation; at each occasion f passing from one social status to the next 
(birth puberty , maniage, death, etc., which are seen as dangerous points 
f lransi lion) the person has to undergo an ordeal which is not only 
symbolically but is actually dangerous. Death is always potentially near. 
This is a particular point which seems to have been forgotten in western 
societies. Our initiation rituals have become symbolic occasions of 
decorated meaninglessness. The deadly dangers of initiat ion apply in 
particular to the entering of the "separate reality" fo shaman. It is 
important to remind ourselves in this context of reports on the many 
"bad trip " under the influence of psychedelics. We could summarize 
this point by saying that there is no guarantee that the "divine" shall 
reveal itself to the n n-initiated person; should someone, however, who is 
not adequately prepared, meet the "deity" in its dreadful aspects, mental 
psychic or somatic damage are possible alternatives. 
My third conclusion, drawn from ethnographic and psychological 
data from non-industrialised tribal and from western and other in-
dustrialised societies, indicates the actuality, efficacy and reality of the 
search for altered states of consciousness. This is a blow to any theory 
about the ever-increasing secularization of the modern world. The search 
for " salvation 'goes in diverse forms: 
psychotropic drugs and other . techniques lead tribal groups and 
individual shamans t0 perceive the wholeness of the cosmos; 
Nco-Marxist and other social utopian thinkers expect the realm 
of freedom in a future society; 
modern messianic and pentecostal movements want the "paradise 
on earth"; 
psychoanalytic methods of various description offer the 
re-assembling or healing of the lost or divided self. 
Whichever method we use to interpret these various forms of a quest 
for something outside the ordinary experience, the choice is an irrational 
and individual one. 
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If this conclusion seems rather ambiguous and uncertain still I would 
like to remind the reader of lhe virtues of Kolakowski's plea for non-
dogmatic inconsistency : 'J.nconsistency is simply a secret awarene s of 
the contradictions of this world".l03 1t is up to us as scholars-on which-
ever quest we might be as private individuals- to elevate this awareness 
from a place of secrecy to a clear and conscious commitment. 
University of Queensland 
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